Private Air Defense from 20 Million UAH: Who Protects Ukrainian Businesses from Shelling and What Will Happen to the Market After the War

Ukrainian businesses are beginning to finance the protection of factories, warehouses, and critical infrastructure from Russian drones and missiles. By mid-July 2026, 51 companies received permission to participate in the private air defense program. However, only groups from four enterprises have reached combat readiness.

The protection of a serious facility can cost from 20 million UAH. Depending on the configuration, a full-fledged system for a large industrial site is estimated to cost between $250,000 and $500,000 or more. Potentially, this is a billion-dollar market, although its actual turnover, number of clients, and contract amounts remain undisclosed.

Delo.ua investigated who is already working in private air defense, what businesses are purchasing, how the government controls the use of weapons, and whether this model will survive after the war.

• Over 50 companies have received access, but only a few are on combat duty
• Why private air defense is not a private army
• How much it costs to protect an enterprise
• What awaits the market

More than 50 companies have received access, but only a few are on combat duty

As of July 16, according to the Ministry of Defense, 62 enterprises applied to participate in the experiment, 51 received special status, but only groups from four companies are on combat duty. The ministry reported more than 50 destroyed Shahed strike drones and Zala reconnaissance drones.

"Authorized enterprise" is a company that the Ministry of Defense has allowed to create its own air defense group and operate within the state air defense system. Such status can be granted to both specialized operators selling services to others and factories, energy companies, or infrastructure operators protecting their own facilities.

Therefore, 51 authorized enterprises do not mean 51 service providers or the same number of paying clients. There is no single open register of active groups, their customers, contracts, and results.

Approximately 20 companies involved in this direction were estimated by Igor Fedirko, executive director of the Ukrainian Council of Armament Manufacturers, in an exclusive comment to Delo.ua. However, these include not only operators but also manufacturers of drones, radars, and electronic warfare systems, equipment suppliers, and system integrators. The number of companies capable of building turnkey protection and providing round-the-clock duty is much smaller.

Among the operators, the most independent confirmations include Carmine Sky and Gvardiia. Reuters described how Carmine Sky combines interceptor drones with remote turrets equipped with M2 Browning machine guns. Gvardiia forms mobile groups and trains pilots—training an operator from scratch takes about three weeks.

Carmine Sky operates through LLC "Carmine Sky." According to the Unified State Register, 55% of the company belongs to director Yegor Korniyenko, and another 45% to Igor Srebrodolsky. The authorized capital is 6.98 million UAH. In 2025, the enterprise declared 3.34 million UAH in revenue and 1.52 million UAH in net profit. However, the company was registered only in September 2025, so these figures do not yet reflect earnings from private air defense.

Behind the Gvardiia brand is LLC "Guard Service 'Gvardiia.'" The owner of 90% and the ultimate beneficiary is Vladislav Halchevsky, while another 10% belongs to director Valerii Kocherha, according to registry data. The authorized capital is 5,000 UAH, and the income for 2025 is not specified in the reporting. The company transitioned to combat operations already in 2026.

SHERIFF, Triarius, and "General Chereshnya" also announced their market entry. SHERIFF offers comprehensive protection—from acoustic detection and electronic warfare to interceptors and turrets, but does not disclose which legal entity the holding received permission. Triarius reported on appeals from private companies and state operators of critical infrastructure, but did not name clients or contract amounts.

The brand "General Cherry" is associated with the LLC "Center for Unmanned Systems Research," owned by Yaroslav Grishin. The company's charter capital amounts to 53.42 million UAH. In 2024, it generated 657.96 million UAH in revenue and 224.36 million UAH in net profit. However, these figures pertain to the entire production of drones, primarily for defense forces, rather than just private air defense.

Operators conceal the number of clients for security reasons. Forbes Ukraine, in its own research, mentioned two private contracts with Carmine Sky, but without names or costs. BBC News Ukraine noted "Kyivvodokanal" among the entities protected by Gvardiia. Other publicly named enterprises mainly appear as potential customers.

Why Private Air Defense Is Not a Private Army

The term "private air defense" is conditional. The money, equipment, and personnel can be private, but the decision to open fire cannot be. Cabinet Resolution No. 1506 allows a company to form its group, but it operates only within the overall system of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU). The Air Command determines the duty area, permitted means, and targets. The group can only use electronic warfare, turrets, or interceptor drones after receiving orders from the military.

According to the algorithms of the Ministry of Defense, the enterprise undergoes verification, coordinates the composition and area of operation of the group with the Air Forces, purchases equipment, trains personnel, and integrates into a unified air defense management system. Operators remain civilian employees, and participation in the group does not guarantee automatic exemption from mobilization.

The company pays salaries, training, procurement, and maintenance of equipment. The acquired equipment remains its property. After changes adopted in March 2026, military units can also temporarily transfer unused state weapons and ammunition to private groups.

The economic prerequisites for such a market emerged in the fall of 2022 when Russia began to use "Shaheds" en masse. The business financed searchlights, thermal imagers, vehicles, and communications for military mobile groups but was not allowed to create its own combat units.

The corporate segment legally appeared in November 2025. In March 2026, the Ministry of Defense confirmed for the first time that private groups intercepted Shahed and Zala drones in the Kharkiv region.

Demand is supported by the scale of danger. In July, Russia used more than 9,000 strike drones and missiles against Ukraine. The Ukrainian air defense intercepted over 5,300 targets. For factories, energy facilities, warehouses, and logistics hubs, air defense is becoming a condition for continuous operation.

The private air defense operator sells not a separate drone or machine gun but the entire chain: "detect --- recognize --- transmit target designation --- strike." This counter-UAS system combines sensors, secure communication, software, electronic warfare means, and kinetic interceptors.

"The value of this model is that the enterprise formulates a specific mission, and manufacturers compete not with individual products but with comprehensive solutions," explains Fedirko.

Thus, private air defense serves as an additional local echelon against strike and reconnaissance drones, rather than a corporate equivalent of Patriot.

How Much Does Enterprise Protection Cost?

The finances of private air defense consist of the initial procurement of equipment, its integration, the ongoing maintenance of the group, and the costs of munitions. Estimates start at around 20 million UAH.

"Depending on the configuration, the protection system for a large industrial site can cost from $250,000 to $500,000 and more. This should be supplemented with expenses for operators, training, maintenance, and new interceptors," notes Fedirko.

This is not the only tariff. The hryvnia and dollar benchmarks relate to different configurations and partially overlap. The price depends on the area of the object, terrain, attack routes, detection range, number of posts, and type of means of destruction.

If each of the 51 authorized enterprises purchased at least one set at a cost of 20 million UAH, the total amount would be 1.02 billion UAH. However, this is merely an illustrative calculation and not the actual turnover: combat groups only have individual enterprises, and some equipment may be provided by the state.

The cheapest means of physically destroying a target remains interceptor drones. Ukrainian devices of this class cost between $1,000 and $2,000, while Shahed drones cost around $30,000. Consequently, the interceptor itself is 15 to 30 times cheaper than the target.

However, this does not mean that guaranteed interception is equally cheap. The total cost includes sensors, communication, standby, repairs, and failed launches. The National Security and Defense Council estimates the average success rate of Ukrainian interceptor missions at over 60%, but does not disclose the detailed calculation methodology.

In comparison, in 2025, the volume of state contracts for Ukrainian interceptors exceeded 3 billion UAH. There is no comparable figure for the private sector.

The main clients could be industrial, energy, agricultural, and logistics companies, for which halting production costs more than the protection system. For small businesses, the threshold of tens of millions of hryvnias is mostly unaffordable. A cluster model might be a solution, where one group protects an industrial zone, port, or logistics hub with several enterprises.

The issue of responsibility remains unresolved. Rules should determine who will compensate for damage if an intercepted drone or debris falls on a residential building or neighboring enterprise: the group owner, the state, or the military command that authorized the use. Without such a mechanism, it is harder for businesses to invest in a system funded by them but used at the command of the state.

What Awaits the Market

In the coming year, the main indicator will not be the number of permits issued, but the number of groups that have actually gone on round-the-clock combat duty. The gap between more than fifty authorized enterprises and several active operators highlights the main problems: the high cost of radars, personnel training, integration with the Air Forces, and access to military target designation.

The market is expected to consolidate around several integrators with confirmed interception statistics. They will sell not a set of equipment, but a long-term service—threat assessment, design, installation, standby, repairs, training, and replenishment of interceptor stocks.